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THE MULTICULTURES OF BELIEF 
AND DISBELIEF 
Sanford Levinson* 
BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS 
RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS. 
By Stephen Bates. New York: Poseidon Press. 1993. Pp. 365. $24. 
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLI-
TICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION. By Stephen L. Carter. New 
York: BasicBooks. 1993. Pp. vii, 328. $25. 
Sometimes I think the environment in which we operate is entirely too 
secular. Th[e] fact that we have freedom of religion doesn't mean we 
need to try to have freedom/ram religion. It doesn't mean that those of 
us who have faith shouldn't fratikly admit that we are animated by that 
faith, that we try to live by it - and that it does affect what we feel, what 
we think, and what we do.1 
I 
In reviewing Stephen Carter's The Culture of Disbelief: How 
American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, 2 one is also 
reviewing a cultural event. How many books, for example, are person-
ally endorsed by the President of the United States?3 Surely no recent 
book written by a law professor has received more reviews and been 
more the subject of discussion in the general media than has Professor 
Carter's.4 He has received respectful, even lavish, praise from across 
• W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Regents Chair in Law, University of 
Texas. A.B. 1962, Duke; Ph.D. (Government) 1969, Harvard; J.D. 1973, Stanford. - Ed. I am 
grateful to Doug Laycock for reactions to an earlier draft of this review. 
1. Remarks by President Clinton in a Photo Opponunity During White House Interfaith 
Breakfast, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, US file, at *3 
[hereinafter Remarks]. I have added the italics in accordance with the presentation of this same 
quotation by Fred Barnes in Rev. Bill. NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1994, at 11. 
2. Stephen Carter is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. 
3. President Clinton noted that he had taken the book with him on vacation, and he went on 
to "urge you all to read it, from whatever political as well as religious spectrum you have[,] 
because at least it lays a lot of these issues out that I am trying to grapple with." Remarks, supra 
note 1, at 3. Clinton also chose to have himself depicted holding Carter's book in his portrait 
recently unveiled at Yale Law School. See David Bollier, Who "Owns" the Life of the Spirit?, 
TIKKUN, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 29. 
4. I suppose that the most plausible competitor would be ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990), though I think that in fact Carter's 
book has penetrated further into generlil American culture - and, of course, Bork was no longer 
a law professor when he wrote his polemic. 
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the political and cultural spectrum. 5 
Carter mounts a vigorous attack on those who would "trivialize" 
religious faith by confining it, like a dotty old relative, to the attic of 
our public household. "[O]ur public culture," Carter argues, "more 
and more prefers religion as something without political significance, 
less an independent moral force than a quietly irrelevant moralizer, 
never heard, rarely seen" (p. 9). As a consequence, insists Carter, the 
surrounding political order treats one's focus on religion as a constitu-
tive aspect of one's life merely as a "hobby,"6 similar, presumably, to 
the interest of the avid philatelist or the builder of model airplanes (p. 
22), rather than recognizing it as deeply constitutive of one's very 
identity. To describe something as a hobby, says Carter, is to label it 
as "something quiet, something private, something trivial - and not 
really a fit activity for intelligent, public-spirited adults" (p. 22). All 
can enjoy their pursuits in "private" while having the good grace and 
common sense to refrain from more than casual reference to their ob-
sessions when encountering in the civic, heterogeneous, "public 
square"7 those of one's fellow citizens who do not share one's own 
religious commitments. In the name of his fellow religious believers, 8 
Carter objects to the marginalization purportedly imposed upon them. 
I say "purportedly" because, as Oliver Thomas, an official of the 
Baptist Joint Committee, has written, a contemporary observer of the 
political scene could quite easily describe "a public square that is not 
only well clothed in the garb of religion but perhaps a bit over-
dressed. "9 Thomas invokes, among other things, the 1988 candidacies 
of Pat Robertson and Jesse Jackson, both ordained ministers; certainly 
no one could accuse God, at least as a referent, of being absent from 
the 1992 political campaign. As illustrated by the prefatory quotation 
to this review, President Clinton is scarcely unwilling to evoke his own 
religious beliefs in public, as is also true of Vice-President Gore.1° As 
Michael Kinsley suggests, 11 it remains suicidal for any politician to 
suggest that she has no belief in God and finds the idea of prayer to be 
a childlike reversion to magical thinking. 
5. Michael Kinsley registered, however, a thoughtful dissent. See Michael Kinsley, Martyr 
Complex, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, at 4. 
6. The "hobby" metaphor is spelled out in chapter 2 of the book. Pp. 23-43. 
7. The term public square was made famous in RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED 
PUBLIC SQUARE (1984), a book substantially similar in spirit to Carter's. 
8. It is an important part of Carter's own self-presentation that he emphasizes his own status 
as a "committed Christian." P. 47. 
9. Oliver S. Thomas, Comments on Papers by Milner Ball and Frederick Gedicks, 4 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY. 451, 451-52 (1990). 
10. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: EcOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 368 
(1992) (referring to his "faith [that] is rooted in the unshakable belief in God as creator and 
sustainer, a deeply personal interpretation of and relationship with Christ, and an awareness of a 
constant and holy spiritual presence in all people, all life, and all things"). 
11. See Kinsley, supra note 5, at 4. 
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Carter rather casually dismisses all such arguments: 
In truth, the seeming ubiquity of religious language in our public debates 
can itself be a form of trivialization - both because our politicians are 
expected to repeat largely meaningless religious incantations and because 
of the modem tendency among committed advocates across the political 
spectrum to treat Holy Scripture like a dictionary of familiar quotations, 
combing through the pages to find the ammunition needed to win polit-
ical arguments. [p. 45] 
One does not know, of course, whether Carter would apply these same 
strictures to Clinton and Gore. If so, his critique is powerful indeed 
- and President Clinton might wish to have his recent Yale Law 
School portrait retouched;12 if not, this raises the obvious question as 
to how one distinguishes the trivial from the authentic - or at least 
nontrivial - invocation of religious themes beyond one's liking for the 
politicians in question and for the policies they espouse. 
Carter can probably save much of his thesis if he simply restricts it 
to the particular culture of the academy rather than offering it as a 
depiction of American culture at large, assuming there is any such 
thing. It is hard to gainsay the general secularism of the academy -
particularly the elite legal academy within which Carter has chosen to 
spend his own life. It is relatively rare to find even a thoroughly main-
stream Episcopalian academic like Carter, let alone an "out" evangeli-
cal Christian who is more sympathetic to the claims of "creation 
science" than to those of Darwinian evolutionism.13 
Carter's thesis and overall approach are in several important re-
spects similar to Michael Perry's, especially as developed in Perry's 
recent Love and Power. 14 First, both criticize those liberals - includ-
ing Carter's Yale colleague Bruce Ackerman - who would limit par-
ticipation in public debate to those willing to obey "a set of 
conversational rules that require the individual whose religious tradi-
tion makes demands on his or her moral conscience to reformulate 
that conscience - to destroy a vital aspect of the self" (p. 229). This 
self-destruction results from expressing any public claim in a secular-
ized language that, by definition, omits reference to any religious foun-
dation for that claim. Carter notes Perry's own insistence that 
acceptance of any such exclusion of explicitly religious convictions 
and the language in which they are expressed "would be to bracket -
12. See supra note 3. 
13. Carter offers an extensive discussion of the creation science controversy (pp. 156-82), and 
he leaves the reader with no doubt that he rejects creationist accounts even as he expresses some 
sympathy for the parents who support their teaching. But, then, so did Martha Minow, The 
Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 92-93 
(1987). One obviously need not be overtly religious in order to come to this conclusion. 
14. MICHAEL J. PERRY, LoVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN 
AMERICAN PoLmCS (1991). 
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indeed, to annihilate -" essential aspects of one's very self. 15 Instead 
of offensively requiring any such bracketing, liberals, according to 
Carter, must "develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dia-
logue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like diversity 
of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not 
abolished" (p. 230). Indeed, he points out, correctly, I believe, that 
liberals who are wont to praise multiculturalism and diversity in most 
contexts are often hesitant to extend the same welcome to those who 
speak, and act in accordance with, the language of traditional 
religion. 16 
It is worth noting, though, that Carter, like Perry, in fact seems 
most comfortable when writing in the standard voice of the liberal 
academic, even as he calls for greater toleration of epistemic diversity. 
Indeed, one of the striking aspects of Carter's book is that not one of 
its substantive arguments, at least in regard to the issues of conven-
tional politics, is made in what might be termed a specifically religious 
voice. As Emily Fowler Hartigan well points out, Carter's book is 
about the importance of religious language rather than written in any 
such language.17 There is almost no resonance in The Culture of Dis-
belief of the "confessional"18 voice found in the writing of fellow 
Christians like Milner Ball,19 Thomas Shaffer,20 or Hartigan herself.21 
Carter does refer to his own religiosity and comment on the impor-
tance of school prayer for his children,22 and at one point he suggests 
that he had engaged in "prayerful consideration" of the "will of God" 
in regard to the controversy over the ordination of women within the 
Episcopal Church. 23 Otherwise, there is not a single paragraph in The 
Culture of Disbelief that would be out of place in the writings of secu-
lar, accommodationist liberals like myself and my colleague Douglas 
15. P. 56 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, PoLmCS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL 
EssAY 181-82 (1988)). 
16. See pp. 180-81. I have assayed some of these issues in Sanford Levinson, Some Reflec-
tions on Multiculturalism, "Equal Concern and Respect," and the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 989 (1993). 
17. See Emily F. Hartigan, Loving the Medium: A Review of Stephen Carter's The Culture 
of Disbelief 1 1993 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
18. See Frank S. Alexander, Speaking Theologically, 42 EMORY L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1993) 
(reviewing MILNER s. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993)). 
19. See MILNER s. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993); MILNER s. BALL, LYING 
DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY (1985). 
20. See. e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981). 
21. See, most notably, Emily F. Hartigan, The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as 
Invitation, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 67 (1991). 
22. See, e.g., p. 185. 
23. Carter refers quite often to the controversy within the Episcopal community regarding 
the ordination of women. See, e.g .• pp. 75-80. He vigorously asserts that "the correct answer to 
the question of ordination of women must be found in prayerful consideration. The answer has 
everything to do with discerning and then enacting the will of God, and nothing to do with the 
rights of women." P. 77. 
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Laycock. Carter, says Hartigan, "asks for the public to embrace the 
previously personalized religious sphere, but does not [himself] 
demonstrate what he advocates space for."24 Whatever Carter's de-
fense of religious devotion, he does not "give ... witness. to its role in 
his own life,"25 at least insofar as his discussion of public policy is 
concerned. 
The closest he comes to anything that might be labeled "witness" 
is in a dramatic response to an assertion by Justice Douglas in his 
dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 26 Douglas asserted that, 
"[w]hile the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire fam-
ily, the education of child is a matter on which the child will often 
have decided views."27 Thus, argued Douglas, the state should ascer-
tain the specific desires of the children in question rather than defer to 
their parents' desires that they receive religiously based education. "It 
is," said Douglas, "the student's judgment, not his parents', that is 
essential .... "28 Carter not only describes Douglas's views as "eccen-
tric" but also, more importantly, goes on to say that if "the state 
should somehow undertake to learn whether our children really want 
to attend a religious school," then "I am quite sure that my family, 
and many others too, will pick up and leave the United States, for no 
nation that strips away the right of parents to raise their children in 
their religion is worthy of allegiance" (p. 192). No one can miss 
Carter's passion on the point, but his very invocation of the language 
of rights - rather, say, than the God-commanded duty to raise his 
children in the one true path - reveals how very much the basic lan-
guage of his argument is thoroughly mainstream. 
Thus, for better or worse, and regardless of whether one agrees 
with Carter concerning each and every particular about public pol-
icy, 29 he does not speak in a voice that is basically challenging, or even 
"defamiliarizing,"30 to any but the most antireligious secularist. For 
me, this is for the better; it surely makes his arguments accessible to a 
24. Hartigan, supra note 17, at 1. 
25. Id. 
26. 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
27. 406 U.S. at 244. 
28. 406 U.S. at 245. 
29. Perhaps it is predictable that I, a secularist who once was a staff attorney for the Chil-
dren's Defense Fund, am considerably more sympathetic with Justice Douglas's point. 
Although, as a parent, I can thoroughly understand the urge to mold one's children, I see no 
argument in principle for treating them in essence as the property of the parents to do with as 
they wish in regard to their education. This is, it should be emphasized, not at all an argument 
that the state should be able to do whatever it wishes in regard to the education of its young 
citizens. I will not explore this issue further in this review. 
30. Defami/iarization has been defined as "the distinctive effect achieved by literary works in 
disrupting our habitual perception of the world, enabling us to 'see' things afresh, according to 
the theories of some English Romantic poets and of Russian Formalism." CHRIS BALDICK, THE 
CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 53-54 (1990). 
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far wider audience than might otherwise be the case. Still, this only 
reinforces Hartigan's observation that the ironic function, albeit surely 
not the purpose, of Carter's book may be to reinforce the hegemony of 
standard models of secular academic discourse even if they are em-
ployed on behalf of religious adherents. 
Finally, whatever Perry's and Carter's critiques of philosophical 
liberalism and some practitioners of liberal politics, they are them-
selves relatively unabashed political liberals as that term is used within 
the spectrum of American politics. Carter speaks throughout his book 
as a friend of political liberalism31 who is worried that the antagonism 
toward religious discourse on the part of some of its philosophical 
leaders will drive those who are religious away from liberalism and 
toward a far more receptive radical right. He clearly views any such 
prospect as potentially disastrous. It can therefore occasion no sur-
prise that President Clinton has so eagerly embraced his book, as is the 
case, I suspect, with many other liberals more secular than the Presi-
dent but equally recognizing the political importance of the return to 
the Democratic Party of evangelical Christians lured away by the Re-
publican Party over the past two decades. 32 Perhaps the party will 
garner some of this support simply by exhibiting a respect for religious 
discourse that has been lacking; it will gain yet more support, I sus-
pect, by demonstrating a willingness to change at least some tradi-
tional political stances associated with liberalism. These include, most 
prominently, hostility to offering any state aid even to parents of mod-
est means in order to allow them to exercise their constitutional right 
to educate their children in religious schools33 or, within the public 
schools, an unwillingness to allow religious students to opt out of as-
pects of the curriculum deemed offensive to their religious tenets. 34 
As already suggested, I substantially agree with Carter's general 
argument and have publicly endorsed some of the same policies that 
he advocates.35 Moreover, as I have indicated elsewhere,36 I basically 
agree that people should be allowed to make whatever arguments us-
ing whatever epistemic discourse they find appropriate. One should be 
able to understand without much effort why resentment might be the 
31. Phillip E. Johnson, who is considerably more conservative than Carter, makes a similar 
point in his review of Carter's book. See Phillip E. Johnson, The Swedish Syndrome, FIRST 
THINGS, Dec. 1993, at 48 (reviewing The Culture of Disbelief). 
32. See, for example, Barnes, supra note 1, at 11; Bollier, supra note 3, at 29; Terry Eastland, 
Religion, Politics & the Clintons, CoMMENTARY, Jan. 1994, at 40, all of whom include discus-
sions of The Culture of Disbelief in their more general analyses of contemporary political 
exigencies. 
33. See, e.g., pp. 192-200. 
34. See, e.g., p. 174; infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
35. See Levinson, supra note 16. 
36. See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
2061, 2077 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN PoLmcs (1991)). 
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response to one's being forced, by the demands of an ostensible system 
of "public reason,''37 to speak a language that is deeply alien to one's 
core being. 
All of this being said, I find it difficult to agree with Carter's sug-
gestion that listeners of the religious discourse of others who do not 
share their religious premises should nonetheless accept or, indeed, 
"cherish" (p. 230) that mode of speech. If someone argues to me that 
God requires X, whether X be social justice for the poor or the prohi-
bition of eating pork, it simply cannot count as a reason for my doing 
X unless I share a view of the world that includes both the ontological 
reality of God's existence and the epistemological possibility of ascer-
taining divine desire. In the absence of the requisite ontology and epis-
temology, the statements predicated upon them simply can have no 
real meaning for me. Similarly, that Scripture declaims about crea-
tion, morality, or the occurrence of miraculous events provides no rea-
son whatsoever for me to accept the particular account offered. That 
is, I gather, what it means to be secular. If one does accept Scripture 
- or, for that matter, anything else - as probative evidence of divine 
revelation, then one is not a secularist. 
Carter begins his second chapter with the statement that "[o]ne 
good way to end a conversation ... is to tell a group of well-educated 
professionals that you hold a political position -preferably a contro-
versial one, such as being against abortion or pornography - because 
it is required by your understanding of God's will" (p. 23). I agree 
with Mark Tushnet, though, that unless the other participants in the 
conversation "share with you a set of religious beliefs about how peo-
ple go about discovering God's will and how to tell when you have 
discerned what God's will really is, it is actually hard to figure out 
where the conversation might go next."38 Carter himself asserts that 
"religion is really an alien way of knowing the world" (p. 43), and it is 
never easy to know how to respond to someone with a sensibility that 
is truly "alien" to one's own. One can say, in a suitable tone either of 
condescension or sarcasm, "that's nice," but that surely would not 
help the conversation along. Otherwise, it seems that all one can do, if 
one is a secularist, is to say, in a tone either of regret or triumph, that 
she just cannot make sense of arguments predicated on "God's will." 
To be sure, invocation of "God's will" does not always still further 
discussion, especially when that phrase is used to refer to the teachings 
of, say, natural law or "right reason," centuries-old, basically rational-
ist traditions of argumentation that can easily be carried on with mini-
mal reference to theological predicates. These traditions use God 
principally as an ontological foundation for what is revealed in fact 
37. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993) (reviewed in this issue by 
Professor Joshua Cohen - Ed.) ("Lecture VI: The Idea of Public Reason"). 
38. Mark Tushnet 8 (1993) (unpublished, untitled manuscript, on file with author). 
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through ordinary methods of rational analysis. Revelation as such 
plays a limited role indeed. For adherents of this position, part of 
God's benevolence has been to give us a rational capacity - or intui-
tion - to achieve knowledge of moral ends. Indeed, one can predicate 
even less rationalist recourse to customary norms and conventional 
wisdom on the notion that they reflect some kind of divine desire. 
The dilemma of religious argument arises most strongly, not in 
these rationalist or quasi-rationalist debates, but, rather, when some-
one evokes God as ordering, through revelation, something that runs 
profoundly counter to what is seemingly taught by ordinary methods 
of reason. Consider, for example, a command to slay a beloved child. 
Kierkegaard well spoke of the "teleological suspension of the ethical," 
referring, of course, to Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. 39 At that point 
one is certainly confronted with an "alien" - some would even say 
bizarre - sensibility that cannot easily be accepted by someone 
outside of its domain. 40 
That someone bases her views on divine revelation, rather than, 
say, presumed messages received from Venusian spaceships, may lead 
me to wish to accommodate those views, especially if the costs are not 
very high in regard to other goals I have.41 Yet it could never lead me 
39. SptEN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING 54-67 (Howard v. Hong & Edna H. 
Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1843) (discussing Abraham's willingness to 
carry out the sacrifice oflsaac). There is, interestingly, a rich Midrashic tradition within Judaism 
that Abraham in fact consummated the sacrifice - just as God is alleged, within the Christian 
tradition, to have sacrificed Jesus. Consider, for example, that the Bible describes only Abraham 
as "return[ing]" from the mountain following the sacrifice. See Genesis 22:19. For a stunning 
exegesis of the Midrashic literature, see SHALOM SPIEGEL, THE LAST TRIAL: ON THE LEGENDS 
AND LoRE OF THE CoMMAND TO ABRAHAM TO OFFER ISAAC AS A SACRIFICE: THE AKEDAH 
(Judah Goldin trans., Jewish Lights Pub. 1993) (1950). 
40. Fairness requires me to note that one might well describe as the "teleological suspension 
of the ethical" the willingness of persons to accept calls of sacrifice, whether of themselves, their 
loved ones, or, of course, strangers, issued by the state. Nothing in this review should be read as 
an endorsement of transferring the commitment formerly felt to a divine presence instead to the 
secular state. 
41. At least two readers have challenged me to specify why I would grant more respect -
and accommodation - to the believer in religious revelation than to the hearer of commands 
from Venus. After all, I have announced that I do not in fact believe that religious revelation is 
any more "real," ontologically, than a command from Venus. I suppose the honest answer to the 
question is that I would classify myself as an agnostic rather than an atheist. That is, I am 
unpersuaded by the evidence of God's existence or participation in human history. Yet I cannot 
find it in me to condemn as "irrational" those who are religious. Perhaps the answer boils down 
to the fact that some of my best friends, whom I respect both as decent human beings and, more 
relevantly to the instant discussion, serious intellectuals, are deeply religious, and I am unwilling 
to dismiss them as being necessarily deluded. When I "look at what is before [my] eyes," 2 
Corinthians 10:7, I just do not see what they do, but maybe it is my eyesight, rather than theirs, 
that is deficient. I am obviously not so generously disposed to the person hearing the Venusian 
commands. Perhaps I would think differently about that if I had some friends within the univer-
sity community who did bear witness to their experience with the Venusians. See Stephen Rae, 
John Mack's Abductees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, for a profile of "a 
Pulitzer Prize-winning Harvard psychiatrist named John E. Mack,'' id. at 30, who recently pub-
lished a book based on his treatment of a number of persons who claim indeed to have been 
abducted by aliens from beyond Earth. See JOHN E. MACK, ABDUCTIONS: HUMAN EN-
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to change my mind about the substantive issue for which she offers the 
revelatory evidence. I might - and do - cherish, for a variety of 
reasons, some who exemplify a religious sensibility, but that is, I think, 
different from genuinely cherishing views that, from my own perspec-
tive, just do not make sense. Just as committed Christians will often 
describe themselves as loving the sinner while hating the sin, I can 
imagine cherishing the person with an alien sensibility - because, for 
example, that person behaves in a variety of commendable ways -
even while I remain thoroughly distanced from - though I certainly 
do not "hate" - the sensibility itself. I suppose that, when all is said 
and done, this means that I do view "religiously based moral argu-
ments as inferior to secular ones" (p. 258), at least in the specific sense 
that the former will prove unavailing to me as reasons for action. 
Could anyone claiming to be a secularist ever not treat theologically 
based arguments as "inferior" - in the operational sense of capacity 
to persuade - even if one admired their intellectual intricacy? To be 
persuaded by a theological argument is, I think, just to say that one is 
not in fact a secularist. Secular arguments, even when offered by 
someone who is otherwise deeply religious, may in fact persuade the 
secularist and lead to changes of mind regarding important public is-
sues. This is, of course, no small point, as illustrated by the following 
example. 
I have written publicly of Michael McConnell's impact on my 
thinking about such issues as the legitimacy of state aid to parochial 
education and accommodation of religious sensibilities in public edu-
cation. 42 Though McConnell is a devout Christian, what affected me 
so strongly was his appeal to a thoroughly secular argument about the 
meaning of equality within the context of the contemporary welfare 
state. Moreover, as I have already indicated, the most persuasive parts 
of Carter's book, at least in regard to most of his fellow legal academ-
ics, are those couched in standard rhetorical tropes devoid of theologi-
cal content. 
A second aspect of Carter's argument that leaves me with decid-
edly mixed feelings is his description of "two chief functions that reli-
gions can serve in a democracy" (p. 36). First, "they can serve as the 
COUNTERS WITH ALIENS (1994). In the book, he apparently indicates that he believes the ac-
counts of his patients and suggests that our own rejection of those accounts is generated 
primarily by a resistance to the enormous implications they have for our most basic beliefs about 
the world. I remain skeptical, but it is chastening, at the least, to find a certified Harvard profes-
sor who is not. Of such developments (sometimes) are paradigm shifts made! 
All of this restates the problem rather than answers it. A genuine answer would, no doubt, 
require a book that I am almost certainly incapable of writing. 
42. See Levinson, supra note 16, at 999-1002. As to McConnell, see especially his brilliant 
article, Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 
104 HARV. L. R.Ev. 989 (1991). See also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Cross-
roads, 59 u. CHI. L. R.Ev. 115 (1992), reprinted in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 
115 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992). 
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sources of moral understanding without which any majoritarian sys-
tem can deteriorate into simple tyranny" (p. 36). Second, "they can 
mediate between the citizen and the apparatus of government, provid-
ing an independent moral voice."43 Indeed, more strongly, Carter in-
sists that "religions are at their most useful when they serve as 
democratic intermediaries and preach resistance" (p. 132) - includ-
ing resistance to the presumably inadequate view of life held by 
secularists. 
As to his first function, the key word is almost certainly can. It 
would be tendentious to deny that particular religious tenets can serve 
to undergird nonoppressive notions of politics. Can, however, is a dis-
tinctly different logical operator from must. It seems equally tenden-
tious to deny that particular religious tenets can encourage 
monumental indifference or, indeed, outright hostility to any notion of 
liberal democracy. As for the indifference, consider only the political 
implications of St. Paul's assertion that "there is no authority except 
from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. There-
fore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and 
those who resist will incur judgment."44 As for active hostility, con-
sider only the triumphalist Catholicism embraced by Ferdinand and 
Isabella and reflected in the Spanish Inquisition led by Torquemada 
and the ruthless expulsion of the Jews in 1492. It is, to put it mildly, 
impossible to view this as contributing to "democracy" or protecting 
against "simple tyranny."45 
This point is necessarily interrelated with his second argument em-
phasizing the "power of resistance" (p. 37) on the part of religions to 
the overweening demands of the state. "A religion is, at its heart, a 
way of denying the authority of the rest of the world; it is a way of 
saying to fellow human beings and to the state those fellow humans 
have erected, 'No, I will not accede to your will'" (p. 41). It is, says 
Carter, important to accommodate such rebels, though "the reason for 
accommodation [is] not the protection of individual conscience, but 
the preservation of the religions as independent power bases that exist 
in large part in order to resist the state" (p. 134). Carter would, no 
doubt, agree with Columbia history professor Istvan Deak's descrip-
tion of Roman Catholicism as "a beautiful anachronism in our age of 
crazed nationalism" insofar as "virtually every devout Catholic pre-
43. P. 36. Carter notes that "from Tocqueville's day to contemporary theories of pluralism, 
the need for independent mediating institutions has been a staple of political science." Pp. 36·37. 
See generally GEORGE A. KELLY, POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICA 
(1984), for a superb treatment of this point in regard to the interplay between particular notions 
of religion and the maintenance of a republican political order. 
44. Romans 13:1-2. 
45. On the expulsion of the Jews, see SOLOMON GRA YZEL, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 400. I 7 
(1947). Nor were the Christians more generous when they expelled the Muslims from Spain in 
the seventeenth century. See ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 246 
(1991). 
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serves in his heart some remnants of his denomination's transnational 
loyalty and the duty of Catholics to defy immoral laws."46 
In the abstract these are powerful, perhaps even thrilling, state-
ments. I have no desire to reinforce the ·general authority - indeed, 
what is sometimes little less than the idolatrous claims - of the mod-
em state, and I often admire those who resist in the name of higher 
authority.47 But, of course, the moral valence assigned to resistance 
may well depend on who is resisting what. 
As Carter himself notes, the "radically destabilizing proposition" 
of resistance is "central not only to the civil resistance of Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., and Mohandas Gandhi, but also to Operation Rescue" 
(p. 41), whose participants not only attempt to disrupt the lawful oper-
ations of abortion clinics but also, and more significantly, appear to be 
quite tolerant of those who would murder doctors who perform abor-
tions. 48 Similarly, as someone concerned with the future of Jewish-
Palestinian relations in Israel and the West Bank, I am less than 
pleased to read that a former chief rabbi of Israel, Shlomo Goren, has 
publicly declared that Jewish law requires that soldiers of the Israeli 
Defense Forces refuse to obey potential orders to uproot Jewish set-
tlers on lands to be given - or, perhaps more accurately, returned -
to their pre-1967 Palestinian possessors.49 Members of Peace Now, a 
dovish group of Israeli Jews, described his call as "seditious" and 
"aimed at undermining the rule of law in Israel"; they urged the gov-
ernment "to place Rabbi Goren on trial for incitement and sedition."50 
One does not have to endorse this latter call, which evokes some of the 
worst episodes in the history of American civil liberties, in order to 
believe that Rabbi Goren and the sensibility he exemplifies are indeed 
46. Istvan Deak, The Incomprehensible Holocaust, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 28, 1989, at 
66, quoted in Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: 
Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1990). 
47. I write these comments on Martin Luther King's birthday, and I have no doubt that the 
United States would have been significantly worse off had King not challenged, from the founda-
tion of his own deep religious commitments, the legitimacy of American racial relations. 
48. After reading a draft of this review, Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen registered excep-
tion to this description of Operation Rescue. He commented that even the position described in 
the text must be understood against the background assumption that abortion is indeed murder 
and multiple abortions thus quite literally mass murder. No doubt he is right, just as I have no 
doubt that I would be considerably more accepting of violence directed against abortionists if I 
shared that view. After all, anyone who supports the bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia, 
with the deaths attendant on such a policy, because of outrage at the murders of innocents now 
taking place in that country, can scarcely claim to be repelled by the infliction of violence on 
wrongdoers if no other option seems likely to stop the offensive actions. To oppose Operation 
Rescue, then, requires taking a substantive position on abortion, rather than simply taking refuge 
in arguments about the obligation always to follow the positive law of the state or, indeed, even 
to refrain always from committing what the state defines as murder. 
49. See, e.g., Herb Keinon, A-G to Check Goren's Statements, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 21, 
1993, at 1. 
50. Id. (quoting petition circulated by Peace Now). 
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menaces to both democracy and peace.51 Of course, it is no part of 
Rabbi Goren's self-description to be "useful" to democracy or even, 
depending on its nature, to peace itself. Indeed, from certain religious 
perspectives, there is something almost insulting about Carter's func-
tionalist defense of religion, for it suggests that religion is best tested 
by its usefulness to basically humanistic concerns rather than by its 
conformity to divine command, whatever the consequences. 
There can be no doubt that many religions have contributed won-
derfully to the world even as defined by secularists; there can be as 
little doubt that many have been the source of great evil and catastro-
phe. Carter does not doubt this; one of his chapters is titled "Reli-
gious Fascism" (p. 263), and, as suggested earlier, he is nearly as 
hostile in general to the political program of the religious right as to 
the insensitivity of the standard-model secular liberal. Still, Carter is 
almost certainly correct when he cautions that the reason to denounce 
"religious fascism" is that it is indeed fascist rather than that it is reli-
gious. 52 That being said, one ought to be no more tolerant, accepting, 
or cherishing of religiously founded fascism than of its more secular 
variants. 
II 
It should be obvious that both proponents and opponents of reli-
gious involvement in public life fundamentally assume that a religious 
perspective can make a real difference to one's activity in the world. 
51. Indeed, since I wrote the above lines, the potential for conflict between at least some 
rabbis and the Israeli state has grown significantly greater in the aftermath of the Hebron massa· 
cre and the growing hints from the Rabin government that at least some settlers may be moved 
from the West Bank. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Now It's the Israeli Right That Urges Soldiers to 
Refuse to Evict Settlers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at AS. The increasing tension is evident in 
the fact that 
three influential rabbis, including a former Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi .•• recently reaffirmed a 
ruling made last year that said religious law requires soldiers to defy any army order to 
evacuate Jewish settlers from the territories. "You must refuse it as you would refuse an 
order to eat pork," said the former Chief Rabbi, Avraham Shapira. 
Id. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described such statements as setting in motion " 'the destruc-
tion of the Israeli Defense Forces and the security of the state.' " Id.; see also Hillel Halkin, 
When Rabin Ran Into the Rambam: Rabbis Preach Defiance to Soldiers of Israel, FORWARD, 
Apr. 8, 1994, at 1. 
I must admit that I am now less inclined to equate a governmental crackdown on these rabbis 
and their allies with the shameful United States prosecution of American communists in Dennis 
v. United States, 341U.S.494 (1951). The former threaten a potential civil war within the Israeli 
Jewish community in a way that the communists never did in this country. Prudence may dic-
tate restraint, but that is obviously different from resting the argument on an abstract principle of 
the state's duty to tolerate truly incendiary speech when delivered, not by "an unkown man," 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), but by persons with 
the stature of Rabbis Goren and Shapira. 
52. See, e.g., p. 266 ("If the Christian Coalition is wrong for America, it must be because its 
message is wrong on the issues, not because its message is religious."). Similarly, secularists are 
in error if they "suppose that it is the Christian Coalition's religiosity rather than its platform that 
is the enemy." Id. 
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This is certainly true phenomenologically, that is, in terms of the self-
understanding of the religious believer. Carter refers at one point to 
"the centrality of the word of God in the lives of believing Christians" 
(p. 77). He had earlier referred to "people who live faith-guided lives" 
as "individuals who look to their religious traditions for instruction, or 
at least influence, not only about how they should behave, but about 
moral truth" (p. 18). Moreover, one should note well President Clin-
ton's avowal, in regard to "those of us who have faith," of its "ani-
mat[ing]" consequences: Religious faith "affect[s] what we feel, what 
we think, and what we do."S3 
Phenomenology, in this account, refers to "internal" understand-
ings. s4 But there is also, of course, the question of observed behavior. 
Clinton's statement, for example, suggests that possession of religious 
faith, as what social scientists call an "independent variable," should 
at least correlate with -and indeed cause - what it is that the posses-
sors "do" in political life. Empirical research certainly does find some 
correlations between religious identification, on the one hand, and 
political beliefs and propensity to vote for given political parties, ss on 
the other, even as it is always necessary to remember that, whatever 
the category, there will always be many "exceptions" who behave con-
trary to stereotype. Let us assume, then, that Carter and Clinton are 
correct in asserting that religious faith "matters"- that one indeed 
discovers something significant about X, in terms of predicting X's 
thought and subsequent behavior, by finding out that X is religious. 
What might follow from this assumption? 
One important consequence, I believe, is .that one might legiti-
mately be interested in the religious faith of public officials precisely 
because one would have reason to believe that it does indeed structure 
53. Remarks, supra note 1, at *3. 
54. See, for example, the famous distinction H.L.A. Hart draws between the "internal" and 
"external" perspectives of law in H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW 86-88 (1961). 
55. See KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND PoLmCS IN THE UNITED STATES 61-101 
(1987) (chapter 4: "The Religious Dimension of American Political Behavior"). In a variety of 
areas, white Protestants, especially if evangelical, are considerably different from those with dif-
ferent religious identities, not to mention secularists. See, e.g., id. at 73 fig. 4.6, 74 fig. 4. 7 (show-
ing that white Protestants are less likely to support racial integration or increased government 
spending to help the disadvantaged than are Roman Catholics, Jews, Black Protestants, or secu-
larists). They are also least likely to support "increased governmental spending on health, educa-
tion, urban areas, and the environment." Id. at 71 fig. 4.5. White evangelicals and Black 
Protestants, moreover, are the most strongly opposed to homosexuality, id. at 75 fig. 4.8, just as 
these two groups, with the addition of Roman Catholics, are most likely to oppose the legaliza-
tion of abortion, id. at 76 fig. 4.9. 
More recently, after analyzing the 1992 election, Professor David C. Leege of Notre Dame 
has suggested, in the words of Washington Post reporter Thomas B. Edsall, that "[r]eligion has 
become a powerful predictor of both political partisanship and ideology." Thomas B. Edsall, 
Religious Activity Tied to Party Loyalty: Role as a Political Predictor Is Similar to That of Race or 
Income, Research Indicates, WASH. Posr, Jan. 6, 1994, at AS. In particular, Professor Leege 
found that whites who are regular churchgoers, especially if they are members of evangelical 
Protestant denominations, are considerably more likely to support Republicans than are whites 
who attend church only irregularly or describe themselves as secular. Id. 
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their actions in the world, including, of course, actions with poten-
tially grave consequences for others. If this is in fact true, it suggests 
that the presence or absence of religious faith is a matter of legitimate 
public concern and, consequently, a fit subject for questions and analy-
sis by news reporters. Far more controversially, one might suggest 
that the same is true of the queries of U.S. senators faced with the task 
of providing advice and consent in regard to presidential nominees for 
high office. 
Imagine, for example, that President Clinton, altogether plausibly, 
chooses to manifest his esteem for Professor Carter by naming him to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals or, indeed, the Supreme Court of 
the United States, for which he is amply qualified in terms of any 
traditional professional criteria. Were I a senator sitting in judgment 
on the nomination, I might well be less interested in discussions of 
Carter's analyses of separation of powers, 56 constitutional interpreta-
tion, 57 or affirmative action5s than in the extent to which his own reli-
gious faith could lead him, as a sitting judge, to resist the commands of 
otherwise valid positive law. I am, for example, particularly interested 
in what Carter might think of a statement by former Justice William J. 
Brennan, a Catholic, that he had, when nominated to the Court in 
1956, "settled in [his] mind that [he] had an obligation under the Con-
stitution which could not be influenced by any of [his] religious princi-
ples"; although he would, "as a private citizen," do "what a Roman 
Catholic does[,] ... to the extent that that conflicts with what [he] 
think[s] the Constitution means or requires, then [his] religious beliefs 
have to give way."59 Does this not reduce Brennan's Catholicism to a 
"hobby," tamed of any real bite vis-a-vis the overriding secular world 
and devoid of those features that elicited Professor Deak's admiration? 
Would Carter, in contrast, devote himself to "prayerful consideration" 
aimed toward "discerning and then enacting the will of God" (p. 77) 
rather than to more secular consideration of what the U.S. Constitu-
tion means, as interpreted without reference to religiously inspired 
modalities? Could Carter legitimately rebuff any such questions as to 
the relevance of his religious faith by reference to Article VI of the 
Constitution, with its prohibition of religious tests for public office, 60 
or by reference to the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establish-
56. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 
(1988); Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-
Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 719. 
57. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Constitution, the Uniqueness Puzzle, and the Economic 
Conditions of Democracy, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136 (1987); Stephen L. Carter, The Right 
Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U. L. REv. 71 (1986). 
58. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, CoNFESSIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). 
59. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CoNSTITUTIONAL FAITH 56 (1988) (quoting Jeffrey T. Leeds, 
A Life on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 25, 79). I discuss this passage 
and its implications in Levinson, supra note 46, at 1063. 
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
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ment Clauses?61 I see no good reason why the answer should .be yes, 
at least if one accepts his - and Clinton's - own proposition that 
religion, when not a "hobby," in fact structures one's entire stance 
toward the world. 
Ironically, Carter is one of our leading scholars of the confirmation 
process, which he has described, indeed, as a "mess."62 One can have 
little doubt that interrogation of nominees as to their religious tenets 
would make confirmation even messier than it is now, and that prob-
lem may be a good reason to veer away from the course described 
above. But it should at least be clear that any such decision is, like 
that involving exclusion of certain dispositive evidence from criminal 
trials, based on second-order policy considerations rather than an ar-
gument that religious views are irrelevant in assessing a nominee's fit-
ness for office. That argument simply cannot be made by anyone who 
accepts the main thrust of Carter's thesis. 
III 
Carter made a deliberate decision, I think it fair to say, to aim his 
book at a general audience rather than at his fellow academics. As a 
result, he often paints his arguments with broad brushes; legal doc-
trines are alluded to rather than carefully analyzed, and contextual 
nuance is sometimes absent. A discussion of the implications of the 
welfare state for the flourishing of religion in America (pp. 136-55) is 
little more than an introduction to a topic that could merit a full book 
in itself. Carter offers two chapters on the complexities attached to 
religion in the public schools (pp. 156-210), but he examines only the 
issue of the teaching of "creation science" in any depth. 63 In the 
course of this discussion, Carter indicates that he would give parents 
"broad rights to exempt their children from education programs to 
which they raise religious objections" (p. 174). "Only in this way," he 
says, can society pay genuine homage to "the epistemological diversity 
that leads some parents to prefer to learn science from the Bible" (p. 
174). It is crucial to emphasize that such "exemption" does not sim-
ply mean the right to avoid public schools entirely, but, rather, it 
means the right to refuse to participate in certain aspects of the regular 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the Amer-
ican Creed: Comments on Sanford Levinson's The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil 
Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107 (1990). 
62. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CoNFIRMATION MESS (1994) (expanding earlier articles, 
including The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1185 (1988), and The Confirmation Mess, 
Revisited, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 962 (1990)). 
63. Pp. 157-82. Interestingly enough, another active Christian law professor, Phillip John-
son, criticizes Carter's portrayal of the dispute for its failure to take with sufficient seriousness 
"the creationist argument that a theory founded upon an a priori faith in metaphysical natural-
ism may not be true." See Johnson, supra note 31, at 50. Johnson is the author of Darwin on 
Trial, which is cited by Carter as a "thoughtful critique of evolution by a critic of creationism." 
P. 304 n.26, (citing PHILIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991)). 
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curriculum even while happily taking part in such parts of the school 
day as are otherwise unobjectionable. 
The right to opt out of selected parts of the public school was 
tested in a remarkable case, Mozert v. Hawkins County [Tennessee] 
Board of Education, 64 which Carter cites in his footnotes65 but, rather 
surprisingly, does not otherwise mention at all. This is a real shame, 
for no contemporary case better poses the complex questions involving 
accommodation of those who sharply counterpose a fundamentalist 
religious ontology and epistemology to the more conventional under-
standings, not only of secularists, but also, in fact, of most who deem 
themselves religious. Fortunately, an excellent complement to 
Carter's book is Stephen Bates's Battleground: One Mother's Crusade, 
the Religious Right, and the Struggle for Control of our Classrooms. 66 
It offers a superb and comprehensive overview of Mozert that no one 
interested in the topics raised by Carter should ignore. Bates offers 
genuine contributions to understanding both the specifics of Mozert 
and the broader issues oftheKulturkampftaking place within the sur-
rounding culture. 
The subtitle of Battleground is at once unfortunate and illuminat-
ing. It is unfortunate in that it might suggest to the casual reader a 
somewhat sensationalist account, especially given its publication by a 
subdivision of Simon and Schuster, a leading mass-market publisher 
with a demonstrated proclivity toward sensationalism. 67 One suspects 
that most readers would predict from the subtitle - and, perhaps, 
from the author's status as a Harvard-trained lawyer - a fairly un-
sympathetic portrayal of the "religious right" and its "struggle for 
control of our classrooms." Those expectations, however understand-
able, are mistaken, for Bates has written a remarkably fair-minded -
at least from my perspective - account of a complex human drama. 
Indeed, the real illumination of the subtitle comes from its emphasis 
on "one mother's crusade," for the book focuses heavily on Vicki 
Frost, the guiding spirit, though not the named plaintiff, of the Mozert 
case. 
Frost objected strenuously to the assignment by the Hawkins 
County schools, which her children attended, of materials from a se-
ries of readers developed by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston that she said 
64. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). For an unusually fine 
discussion of the legal and theoretical issues raised by this case, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He 
Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal 
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993). 
65. See p. 305 n.39. 
66. Stephen Bates is a senior fellow at the Annenberg Washington Program of Northwestern 
University. 
67. Simon and Schuster and its subdivisions have published, for example, the sensationalized 
KITrY KELLEY, NANCY REAGAN: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY (1991), and JOE McGIN-
NISS, THE LoST BROTHER (1993) (biography of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
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called into question tenets of her fundamentalist Christian faith. For 
example, one story involved mental telepathy, which Frost rejected as 
contrary to her faith. Other stories suggested that certain ways of life 
condemned by Frost's own theological understanding, such as "wo-
men's liberation," were in fact tolerable and worthy of respect. Yet 
others seemingly taught that Christianity was not a uniquely privi-
leged road to God. 68 
It is essential to realize what Frost and her colleagues did, and did 
not, claim. Although at one point they appeared to demand the exci-
sion of offensive books from the public school curriculum as such, they 
in fact dropped any such demands and in,stead insisted only that their 
children be allowed to read other, nonoffensive material and be ex-
empted from any class discussions involving the offensive works {pp. 
37-38). As Bates makes clear, the schools initially accommodated 
them. The children retreated to the school library while their class-
mates discussed the regularly assigned reading {p. 71). 
What made all the difference was a policy decision by the Hawkins 
County School Board itself that any such accommodation was unac-
ceptable {p. 85). In effect, the Board made it a condition of attending 
public schools that students accept, without exception, the precise cur-
riculum established by the public school system. One might view this 
as the offer of a classic adhesion contract: the potential consumer of 
public school services must take it - that is, attend the public schools 
on the terms offered - or leave it - exercise one's option, protected 
by Tennessee law, 69 to opt out of the public schools entirely and attend 
a private school or, indeed, receive home schooling. 
To put it mildly, Hawkins County never demonstrated what be-
sides administrative convenience justified such a limited set of options. 
Nor, I think, could it have made such a successful demonstration. 
The reason is simple. As noted by Judge Lively, writing for the major-
ity in the Sixth Circuit, "[t]he state board of education and local 
boards of education are prohibited from regulating the selection of 
faculty or textbooks or the establishment of a curriculum in church-
related schools."70 It seems, therefore, impossible for the State to ar-
gue that it has any very high interest in any given facet of its public 
school curriculum if it in fact allows the opt-out by those who choose 
nonpublic schooling. In any event, though, the Sixth Circuit proved 
unsympathetic to any such arguments and upheld the power of the 
Board, 71 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari without any re-
68. For all of these examples, see pp. 19-29. 
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3001(c)(4) (Supp. 1993). The U.S. Constitution presumably 
protects this option as well. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
70. TENN. CooE ANN. § 49-50-801(b) (1990), quoted in Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067. 
71. Although Judge Boggs, in a concurring opinion, displayed extraordinary sensitivity to 
the issues raised by the case - a sensitivity almost wholly lacking in the opinions by his col-
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corded dissent. 72 
Bates makes two essential contributions in Battleground. First, he 
conveys, with a minimum of editorial comment, the personalities and 
views of the major participants in the struggle. He is not interested in 
creating melodramatic heroes or villains. Second, Bates demonstrates 
that one of the factors that almost undoubtedly led to the polarization 
between the parents and the school board was the participation of na-
tional organizations driven by their own goals and representing pro-
foundly different sectors of the American class and social structure. 
On the part of the parents, the chief organization was Concerned 
Women for America (CWA), led by Tim and Beverly LaHaye. They 
provided the parents with their chief lawyer, Michael P. Farris, a 
Gonzaga Law School graduate who was a "Baptist who believed the 
Bible is literally true, a recently ordained minister, and a father who 
taught his children at home in order to safeguard them from the cor-
ruptions of the public schools."73 "[T]wo other CWA lawyers and a 
law student" joined Farris at trial (p. 234). The school board was be-
friended by People for the American Way (PAW), which led ulti-
mately to its representation by Timothy Dyk, a Harvard Law School 
alumnus and partner at Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, a major Wash-
ington law firm. Indeed, working with Dyk were four other lawyers 
from Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, along with three local lawyers 
and a lawyer representing the State of Tennessee, which had inter-
vened (p. 234). 
Bates quotes a member of the team defending the school board as 
saying that the case "was very much Concerned Women for America 
versus People for the American Way. The local school board officials 
and the local plaintiffs, while not pawns, were somehow less impor-
tant" (p. 235). Bates argues that, "[d]espite their mirror-image polit-
ical convictions, People for the American Way and Concerned 
Women for America had much in common in the early 1980s" (pp. 
149-50), beginning with the fact, as revealed in the very titles of their 
respective organizations, that each "claimed to represent the truest 
traditions of the United States" (p. 150). Concomitantly, "[e]ach saw 
the other as part of a wealthy, well-disciplined cabal aiming to quash 
dissent: to outlaw Christianity, to outlaw pluralism; to force anti-
religious views on everyone, to force religious views on everyone" (p. 
150). For Beverly LaHaye, whom Bates describes as challenging 
Phyllis Schlafiy for the status of "the religious right's leading woman" 
(p. 105), secular humanism is a "pernicious philosophy," and 
leagues Judge Lively and Judge Kennedy - he still adopted a posture of extreme judicial re· 
straint that left the plaintiffs, as a practical matter, helpless. 
72. 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). 
73. Pp. 113-14. More recently, Farris ran unsuccessfully as the Republican candidate for 
lieutenant governor of Virginia. 
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"[f]eminism and the sexual revolution are tentacles of the octopus Hu-
manism which is seeking to destroy Christianity and Christian princi-
ples in American life" (p. 103). For PAW, groups like CWA and 
parents like the Frosts and Mozerts were reducible to opponents of 
"diversity, discussion and just plain thinking,'' who were, in addition, 
racist and antisemitic (pp. 150-51). For the PAW attorneys, in partic-
ular, there was another brooding omnipresence over the suit: Jerry 
Falwell, then president of the Moral Majority, at that time the most 
prominent organization of militantly right-wing evangelical Chris-
tians. Bates quotes a member of the team defending the school board 
as saying that "the enemy was really not Frost or Mozert, but Falwell, 
lurking in the background" (p. 235). 
As Anthony Podesta, the president of PAW, put it, "This one was 
made to order. Vicki Frost, Michael Farris, Beverly LaHaye, the 
Gablers - scriptwriters in Hollywood could not have invented a bet-
ter cast of characters. It just seemed too delicious to believe."74 Deli-
cious or not, the suit clearly took on a life of its own that left the 
actual adversaries, neighbors in Hawkins County, far behind, and 
Bates tells the courtroom story well. Law students could do far worse 
than study his tale as an example, for better and distinctly for worse as 
well, of contemporary American "public interest" litigation in which 
each side is represented by ideologically zealous organizations who 
view the actual clients as little more than pawns in larger struggles 
over control of American culture - and, it must be said, as useful 
symbols in the endless solicitation of financial contributions from ordi-
nary citizens who share one or the other set of fears and willingness to 
demonize the opposition. 
CONCLUSION 
From the very beginning of our national history, the United States 
has been blessed - or burdened - by an almost astonishing array of 
religious sects and, concomitantly, by the necessity to decide what 
measure of toleration or accommodation is due those who deviate 
from the dominant culture in belief or, more ominously, in practice. 
Our national motto - e pluribus unum - has always carried with it 
an implicit question mark as to our ability to weave some kind of so-
cial unity out of the diversity found in our social fabric. Multicultural-
ism is simply the most recent rhetorical label for this' aspect of 
American reality, with attendant concern about the "fraying"75 or 
"disuniting"76 of America being countered by equally heartfelt de-
fenses, as seen in The Culture of Disbelief, of the importance of accom-
74. P. 165. The Gablers are a Texas couple who for decades have monitored public school 
textbooks looking for signs of secular humanist philosophy. Pp. 25-27. 
75. See ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT: THE FRAYING OF AMERICA (1993). 
76. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1992). 
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modating even "alien" sensibilities and practices. For better or worse, 
there is no reason to believe that American culture will become more 
homogeneous or that fewer cases in the future will test the meaning of 
multiculturalism when culture involves religious dimensions. Each of 
these two books offers its own contribution to understanding why the 
issue perseveres and why it is so unlikely, as well, that any genuine 
consensus will bridge the chasm that now separates the various 
contenders. 
